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1 Introduction
Different researchers characterize entrepreneurs differently. It is well known that
Knight (1921) emphasizes risk bearing as the main function of entrepreneurs while
Schumpeter (1947) views entrepreneurs as persons who do new things. However,
these are not the only functions of entrepreneurs discussed in the literature.
Many studies, for example, point out the prediction of idiosyncratic changes as
an important element of entrepreneurship. Kirzner (1973) discusses the essential
role of entrepreneurial discovery in market processes. Schultz (1975) defines entre-
preneurial ability as the ability to interpret new information and reallocate resources
to take advantage of profitable opportunities. More recently, Casson (2005) reviews
the literature and argues that judgmental decision-making is a common feature of
entrepreneurship.
Although these studies provide many valuable insights, they do not discuss how
entrepreneurship influences aggregate statistics such as aggregate productivity and
the distribution of firm size. These considerations demand a model to locate the
prediction of idiosyncratic changes within standard macroeconomics.
This paper models entrepreneurship as the entrepreneur’s information processing
activity in order to predict changes in demand and reallocate resources. It then ana-
lyzes how entrepreneurship influences aggregate productivity. When there is uncer-
tainty in demand, entrepreneurs reallocate their attention to processing information
in order to predict the direction and magnitude of changes in demand. Although
these changes can be inferred from a number of signals, some signals are more in-
formative than others. Able entrepreneurs are assumed to know which signals are
more informative for prediction. Guided by prior knowledge, they process specific
signals in order to improve the accuracy of their predictions. Better prediction allows
entrepreneurs to reallocate resources toward more profitable opportunities, and this
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improves the allocative efficiency of the economy.
The paper shows that the benefits of reallocation are captured by a reduction in
an aggregate price index through fierce competition among firms. By processing
local information, firms can increase their outputs when demand for their products is
high, enabling them to set a higher price. Conversely, firms can reduce outputs when
they set a lower price due to low demand. The strong correlation between price and
output increases the firm’s expected revenues. However, when total expenditure is
constant, an increase in firm revenue involves a reduction in expenditure on goods
provided by other firms. This demand-stealing effect results in a reduction in the
aggregate price index and, therefore, an increase in measured aggregate productivity.
If ability differs across agents, competition leads to selection among entrepreneurs.
This provides an additional mechanism that influences aggregate productivity. As the
reduction in the aggregate price index lowers expected profits and increases real wage
payments, less able entrepreneurs choose to be workers. Because more resources are
then dealt with only by high-ability entrepreneurs in equilibrium, allocative efficiency
and aggregate productivity in the economy again increase.
Note that this selection mechanism also influences the distribution of firm size.
As the increase in the ability difference across entrepreneurs forces less able entrepre-
neurs to become workers, it reduces the number of firms and increases the number of
available workers. Hence, it increases not only size differences across firms, but also
the average firm size.
The role of entrepreneurial ability in the economy is magnified when demand is
more volatile and goods more substitutable. An increase in idiosyncratic risk in-
creases the importance of prediction, whereas an increase in the substitutability of
goods makes the demand for each good more sensitive to changes in tastes. Hence,
both increase the benefits of prediction. As the increase in risk and the substitutabil-
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ity of goods increases the benefits from more able entrepreneurs, they force less able
entrepreneurs to be workers through a further reduction in the aggregate price. It is
then shown that increases in risk and the substitutability of goods increase not only
the average size differences, but also the average size of firms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and clarifies
the concepts used in the paper. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 analyzes
the equilibrium and derives real GDP as a function of entrepreneurship. Section 5
analyzes how a change in the distribution of entrepreneurial ability influences real
GDP and the size distribution of firms. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the
main results and discussing some possible extensions.
2 Literature Review
Labor economists empirically investigate the importance of the ability to predict
changes. Welch (1970) points out that the effect of education on the production
process can be decomposed into two components. Higher education enables a worker
to increase the amount of output produced from a given quantity of inputs (the
worker effect); it also allows the worker to interpret information about the profitabil-
ity of resource allocation, and this enables the worker to make better use of resources
(the allocative effect). Schultz (1975) regards the allocative effect of education as
the source of entrepreneurial ability and Takii (2003) compares these effects of hu-
man intelligence in the context of managers’ human capital: managerial ability is
considered as the ability to organize and increase productivity and entrepreneurial
ability is considered as the ability to predict and react changes. This study follows
this distinction but allows entrepreneurs to process information based on knowledge
about the relationship between observable information and shocks in taste. Hence,
entrepreneurial ability is measured by the importance of knowledge for prediction.
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Another strand of the literature suggests that information processing activities can
also be an important component of entrepreneurship [e.g., Fiet (1996) and Casson
(2005)]. There are several features of entrepreneurial information processing: 1) By
processing information, entrepreneurs observe risk-reducing signals [e.g., Fiet (1996)].
2) Information must be specific [e.g., Hayek (1945), Fiet (1996) and Casson (2005)].
3) Entrepreneurial discovery occurs under imperfect competition [e.g., Fiet (1996) and
Kirzner (1997)]. 4) An entrepreneur is better suited to assess specific information
because of appropriate prior knowledge, which can be the result of previous experience
[e.g., Fiet (1996) and Shane (2000)] and/or education [e.g., Schultz (1975)]. This
paper incorporates all of these features of entrepreneurship into a general equilibrium
model.
Because this paper defines entrepreneurial ability as the entrepreneur’s knowledge
about the relationship between observable information and changes in demand, the
analysis can be linked naturally to firm decisions under uncertainty. In the nice
survey by Hey (1979), the previous literature on firm decisions under uncertainty
takes information structure as given and analyzes its impact on firm’s decision in a
partial equilibrium model. In contrast, this paper assumes that entrepreneurship
can convert information structure and analyzes how entrepreneurship influences the
aggregate economy in a general equilibrium model.
It is also important to distinguish between differences in prediction accuracy and
flexibility. Economic theories of the firm investigate how firms adapt to changes
by examining firm flexibility. Many theorists investigate the tradeoff between static
efficiency and flexibility (e.g., Mills and Schumann (1985) and Thesmar and Thoenig
(2000)). Unlike these studies, we pay greater attention to a firm’s prediction ability.
In other words, we investigate the ability of firms to adapt appropriately to changes
in demand, whereas the existing literature on flexibility investigates the ability of
5
firms to quickly or costlessly adapt to changes in demand. As flexibility improves
profits only when firms know how decisions should be changed, our results provide
useful complementary information for making inferences about the importance of
these theories.
This is not the first paper to incorporate a similar definition of entrepreneurial
ability into a general equilibrium model [e.g., Hassler and Mora (2000), Takii (2004;
2008)]. Hassler and Mora (2000) discuss the relation to social mobility and Takii
(2004; 2008) considers the impact of entrepreneurial ability on aggregate productivity
and on expansionary fiscal policy, respectively. However, no earlier work explicitly
models how entrepreneurs process information to change information structure, which
is the essence of entrepreneurship in this paper, and no study examines the impact
of entrepreneurship on the size distribution of firms.
3 Model
In this section, we construct a model to analyze the aggregate impact of entrepreneur-
ship. There are two occupations in an economy: entrepreneurs and workers. Each
firm needs one entrepreneur to organize the firm. In this model, for simplicity, there
is no distinction between entrepreneurs, managers, plants, and firms. This simplifi-
cation is made to develop a tractable model that focuses on information processing
activity as the essence of entrepreneurship. The goods market is assumed to be
monopolistically competitive and each entrepreneur faces her own inverse demand
function and produces output by employing workers. Each demand curve is subject
to taste shocks that entrepreneurs cannot observe when they make production deci-
sions. They process information and infer the direction and magnitude of these taste
shocks. We construct a model to analyze how these information processing activities
influence the aggregate economy.
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Inverse Demand Function: There are heterogeneous households in an economy.
The jth household is assumed to maximize the following utility subject to its budget
constraint:
Uj ≡ max
xij
∙Z m
i
zix
α
ijdi
¸ 1
α
, α = 1− 1
ρ
∈ (0, 1) ,
s.t. Y nj =
Z m
i
pixijdi,
where xij is the amount of good i consumed by the jth household, zi is a product-
specific taste shock for product i, pi is the price for product i, m is the number of
products, and Y nj is the expenditure of the jth household. As the parameter ρ is
the measure of the substitutability of goods, α also captures the substitutability of
goods. Using standard procedures, the inverse demand function for good i can be
derived as follows.
pi = zix
α−1
i P
α (Y n)1−α , (1)
P =
∙Z m
i
p
α
α−1
i z
1
1−α
i di
¸α−1
α
, (2)
Y n =
Z
Y nj dj, xi =
Z
xijdj, (3)
where P is the price index and Y n is nominal GDP. As we assume that the household
sector is the only sector that buys products, the total sum of consumer expenditure
is nominal GDP in this analysis.
A Firm’s Problem: An entrepreneur establishes a firm, employs workers, and pro-
duces output. A single firm produces one variety of each good and an entrepreneur
faces an inverse demand curve, equation (1). However, when she undertakes pro-
duction, she does not know what the realized taste shock is. The timing sequence
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is described as follows. (1) A taste shock occurs. (2) An entrepreneur processes
this information and infers the realized taste shock. (3) A firm produces nonstorable
goods by choosing the amount of employed workers. (4) The firm discovers the true
taste shock. (5) The firm sets its price to equate demand with the goods produced.
We now describe the behavior of a representative firm and omit subscript i where the
intended meaning is clear.
Because the movement of z is not observed ex ante when z changes, the entrepre-
neur must predict the direction and magnitude of the change so as to appropriately
respond. When the entrepreneur makes production decisions, z is not observed,
but noisy signals are observed, SAv ≡
©
sAj
ªv
j=1
, from which the realization of z can
be inferred. As discussed later, the accuracy of prediction depends on the qual-
ity of signals, A, and the amount of signals, v, the entrepreneur actually processes.
We consider that the variable v captures the intensity of entrepreneurship. It is
assumed that the entrepreneur’s inference is based on a conditional distribution func-
tion, Qh
¡
z|SAv¢, where h measures the accuracy of an entrepreneur’s prediction for
changes in z. We specify the information structure later.
Note that because z is specific to a particular product, the required information
is also specific to the product. As only one firm produces this product, this is purely
firm-specific information. Many researchers point out the importance of specific
information in the entrepreneurial discovery process. The current model incorporates
the spirit of this argument.
The production function is assumed to be linear: x =M (v)L in labor where L is
the amount of labor input andM (v) is the productivity of a firm’s production process.
When an entrepreneur establishes a firm, she must set up the production process in
order to organize the firm. This activity is assumed to increase the productivity of
a firm’s production process. When an entrepreneur processes more signals, v, she
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may not be able to spend enough time setting up the production process. Hence, we
assume that M 0 (v) < 0.
It is assumed that the financial market is complete. Therefore, entrepreneurs
can hedge any idiosyncratic risk. Although financial investors cannot scrutinize
the information entrepreneurs observe, they are assumed to know the entrepreneurs’
effort level and their ability, which influence the accuracy of information, h. Hence,
there is no distortion caused by asymmetric information. Entrepreneurs maximize
their firm’s expected profits:
π
¡
SAv
¢
= max
L
½Z
pdQh
¡
z|SAv¢x− wL¾ ,
s.t. p = zxα−1Pα (Y n)1−α , x =M (v)L,
where w is the wage rate.
The solution to the profit maximization problem reveals that the optimal price,
p
¡
z,SAv
¢
, has to be equal to a constant markup, 1
α
, times marginal cost, w
M(v)
, on
average:
p
¡
z,SAv
¢
=
zR
zQh (z|SAv)
w
αM (v)
. (4)
Note that the actual price deviates from the constant markup rule due to entrepre-
neurs misunderstanding changes in tastes, zR
zQh(z|SAv) . When the true z is discovered,
the entrepreneur realizes that it differs from the predicted value. If the realized z is
greater than the predicted one,
R
zQh
¡
z|SAv¢, then the entrepreneur can set a higher
price than the markup rule. If z is lower than
R
zQh
¡
z|SAv¢, then the entrepreneur
must set a lower price.
Entrepreneurs produce more when they can set high prices, and produce less when
they must set low prices. Hence, expected revenue is influenced by the accuracy of
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prediction:
Eh [px] = [z (h)M (v)α]
1
1−α
∙
αP
w
¸ α
1−α
Y n,
z (h) ≡
"Z ∙Z
zdQh
¡
z|SAv¢¸ 11−α dQhs ¡SAv¢
#1−α
,
where Eh [px] =
R
p
¡
z,SAv
¢
x
¡
SAv
¢
dQhzs
¡
z,SAv
¢
, Qhs
¡
SAv
¢
and Qhzs
¡
z,SAv
¢
is the
marginal and joint distribution function of z and SAv.
Furthermore, as the expected amount of labor and the expected profits are pro-
portional to Eh [px] in this model, the accuracy of prediction also influences them
through its impact on expected revenue.
Z
L
¡
SAv
¢
dQhs
¡
SAv
¢
=
α
w
Eh [px] , (5)Z
π
¡
SAv
¢
dQhs
¡
SAv
¢
= (1− α)Eh [px] , (6)
where L (·) is an optimal labor function.
Information Structure: The accuracy of information can be a function of entrepre-
neurship. We assume that entrepreneurs use their ability to process information and
make sound judgments. In order to construct an operational model, we must specify
the information structure. Assume that ln z is normally distributed with mean −σ2z
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and variance σ2z. This means that the expected value of z is normalized at 1. The
random deviation of z from 1 represents ex ante unknown changes in taste.
Assume that there are many signals that are correlated with ln z with error:
sAj = ln z + ε
A
j
where εAj is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2z
A
. Signals differ by
their precision. People may learn the relationship between a signal, sAj , and shock,
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ln z, from education or previous experience. But without knowing this relationship,
signals are of no value to entrepreneurs. Researchers are split on their opinions
about how prior knowledge is obtained. However, all agree that entrepreneurs are
heterogeneous in terms of the knowledge used to detect important information. Tal-
ented entrepreneurs are assumed to know which signal is more accurate. Hence, the
parameter A can be interpreted as the measure of entrepreneurial ability.
Using their prior knowledge, entrepreneurs observe this signal v times. Let us
measure the accuracy of prediction by h = 1−
R
(ln z−
R
ln zdQh(z|SAv))2dQhzs(z, SAv)
σ2z
, which
is suggested by Takii (2007) as an estimable measure of the accuracy of prediction.
This measure is equivalent to R2 that is obtained when we regress ln z on
Pv
j s
A
j
v
. It
is easy to show that h can be a function of A and v:1
h = η (Av) ≡ Av
Av + 1
.
This shows that the intensity of entrepreneurship, v, and entrepreneurial ability, A,
increase h and, therefore, reduce perceived risk. This is consistent with arguments
by Fiet (1996). Applying Lemma 2 in Takii (2007) to the current problem, z (h) is
shown to be a function of A and v.
z (h) = exp
ασ2zη (Av)
2 (1− α) .
1The measure h can be rewritten as h =
R
[
R
ln zdQh(z|SAv)−
R
ln zdQhz (z)]
2
dQhs (SAv)
σ2z
. This analysis
focuses on a multiplicative shock, and the shock and the corresponding signal are log-normally
distributed. In this case, we can show that signals are informative in the sense of Blackwell (1953)
if and only if the conditional expectation
R
ln zdQh
¡
z|SAv¢ is risky in the sense of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970). The measure h captures this property. Of course, the variation of ln z can also
influence that of
R
ln zdQh
¡
z|SAv¢. Hence, we divide it by σ2z so that h is independent of σ2z.
Hence, h is not influenced by exogenous risk.
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Entrepreneurship: Processing information reduces the time available to set up
the production process due to their limited attention capacity. Hence, it lowers the
productivity of their firm’s production process. Knowing this tradeoff, entrepre-
neurs optimally choose the amount of information they observe. We assume that
M (v) = exp (−βv) for a simple analysis. An entrepreneur’s decision problem is then
summarized as follows.
Π (A) ≡ max
v
(1− α)Eη(Av) [px] ,
Eη(Av) [px] =
∙
exp
αx (α,σ2z, A, v)
1− α
¸ ∙
αP
w
¸ α
1−α
Y n,
x
¡
α,σ2z, A, v
¢
=
σ2zη (Av)
2 (1− α) − βv.
Define v (α,σ2z, A) as the optimal solution to this problem. Ignoring integer con-
straints, we assume that the first-order conditions can approximate optimal condi-
tions. The optimal conditions can then be described as follows.
v
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
=
q
σ2zA
2β(1−α) − 1
A
, if A ≥ 2β (1− α)
σ2z
,
v
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
= 0, if A <
2β (1− α)
σ2z
.
This shows that if entrepreneurs do not have enough prior knowledge, they choose
not to process information. Instead, they focus on preparation for the production
process so that they can produce more. However, the impact of ability on the amount
of processing information is not monotonic. It is shown that
vA
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
≥ 0, if 2β (1− α)
σ2z
≤ A ≤ 8β (1− α)
σ2z
.
vA
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
< 0, if A >
8β (1− α)
σ2z
.
When entrepreneurs know where an informative signal is, they have greater incentive
to process the information. However, if signals are extremely accurate, entrepreneurs
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do not require too many signals. For example, if entrepreneurs can perfectly observe
the movement of ln z, just one observation is sufficient to detect the movement in
ln z.
Note that increases in the substitutability of goods and risk increase the amount
of information that entrepreneurs process:
vα
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0, vσ2z
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0, if A ≥ 2β (1− α)
σ2z
.
An increase in risk increases the value of accurate information, while an increase in
the substitutability of goods makes demand more sensitive to taste shocks. Hence,
this also demands more information.
It is interesting to note that the substitutability of goods increases flexibility in
changing the amount of output. When goods are more substitutable, equation (1)
suggests that the demand curve is flatter. Hence, an entrepreneur can change the
amount of output without reducing prices greatly. An entrepreneur can exploit the
benefits from better information when she can easily change her decisions. Hence,
an entrepreneur spends more time processing information when α is large.
Although an increase in entrepreneurial ability has ambiguous effects on the
amount of information processed, it unambiguously increases profits. To see this,
let us define a function x∗ such that x∗ (α,σ2z, A) ≡ x (α,σ2z, A, v (α,σ2z, A)). Then
x∗ (α,σ2z, A) can be solved as
x∗
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
=
β
A
"s
σ2zA
2β (1− α) − 1
#2
, if A ≥ 2β (1− α)
σ2z
,
= 0, if A <
2β (1− α)
σ2z
.
13
We can easily check that when A ≥ 2β(1−α)
σ2z
,
x∗A
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0, (7)
x∗α
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0, x∗σ2z
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0, (8)
x∗Aα
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0, x∗σ2zA
¡
α,σ2z, A
¢
> 0. (9)
Equation (7) shows that entrepreneurial ability increases profits. In addition, equa-
tion (8) and equation (9) show that not only are profits increasing in α and σ2z, but
α and σ2z are also complementary in A. That is, increases in risk and the substi-
tutability of goods increase the marginal profitability of entrepreneurial activities.
Let us define a function η∗ such that η∗ (A) = η [Av (α,σ2z, A)]. Because entrepre-
neurial ability increases firm prediction, expected revenue is an increasing function of
A:
Eη
∗(A) [px] = exp
∙
αx∗ (α,σ2z, A)
1− α
¸ ∙
αP
w
¸ α
1−α
Y n. (10)
Note that exp
∙
αx∗(α,σ2z ,A)
1−α
¸
= M (v (α,σ2z, A)) = 1 if and only if v (α,σ
2
z, A) = 0.
Hence, the component exp
∙
αx∗(α,σ2z ,A)
1−α
¸
= E
η∗(A)[px]
E0[px]
≥ 1 is the relative expected
revenue gain from processing information. In this paper, this is considered as the
gain from entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship improves expected revenue because it
allows entrepreneurs to produce more when demand is high and less when demand is
low. As shown, this revenue gain is an increasing in α, σ2z and A.
The arbitrage condition: An agent can be an entrepreneur or a worker. Let
us assume that entrepreneurial ability is distributed along a continuous distribution
function G (A). Let N denote the number of workers that have an ability less than
or equal to A. Then G (A) = N . It is convenient to define an inverse distribution
functionΓ such that A = Γ (G (A)). The use of the inverse distribution function
makes it easier to analyze the model. The value Γ (N) represents the ability level
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that the N
Ns
percentile from bottom agent obtains, where Ns is the total population.
Because entrepreneurs can completely hedge their risks in the financial market,
they do not bear risk. As x∗A (α,σ
2
z, A) ≥ 0, Π0 (A) ≥ 0. Because G (A) is continuous
distribution function, Γ0 (·) > 0. Hence, there is a unique cutoff ability Γ (N∗) with
which an agent expects to earn the same income from being an entrepreneur or a
worker:
w = Π (Γ (N∗)) = (1− α)Eη∗(Γ(N∗)) [px] . (11)
The second equation is derived because the expected profits are proportional to the
expected revenue.
Resource constraints: Using the function Γ we can define the labor market clearing
condition as follows.
N∗ =
Z Ns
N∗
Z
L
¡
SAv
¢
dQη
∗(Γ(N))
s
¡
SAv
¢
dN. (12)
The left-hand side is the supply of labor and the right-hand side is the demand
for labor. The equation states that the bottom N∗ agents in the ability distrib-
ution become workers and the top Ns − N∗ agents in the ability distribution be-
come entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs with the ability Γ (N) demand labor byR
L
¡
SAv
¢
dQ
η∗(Γ(N))
s
¡
SAv
¢
, the right-hand side of equation (12) is the total demand
for labor.
As expected labor is proportional to expected revenue in equation (5), equation
(12) can be rewritten as
N∗ =
α
w
Z Ns
N∗
Eη
∗(Γ(N)) [px] dN. (13)
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4 The Distribution of Firm and Real GDP
In this section, we investigate the implications for the distribution of firm size and
real GDP. First, we show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and discuss the
implications on the distribution of firm size. Later, we derive real GDP and discuss
the effect of entrepreneurial ability on aggregate productivity.
Equilibrium: This is derived from equation (11) and (13) where
Z Ns
N∗
exp
α [x∗ (α,σ2z,Γ (N))− x∗ (α,σ2z,Γ (N∗))]
1− α dN =
1− α
α
N∗. (14)
This equation determines an equilibrium level of N∗. The existence and unique-
ness of N∗ can be easily proved. The formal proof is established in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique N∗.
Note that N∗ contains several items of information. First, N∗ is the number of
workers. Second, Ns−N∗ is the number of firms. Third, N∗
Ns−N∗ can be interpreted as
the average firm size. Fourth, it also relates to the average differences in revenue. As
exp
∙
αx∗(α,σ2z ,A)
1−α
¸
= E
η∗(A)[px]
E0[px]
, the expected revenue differences due to differences in en-
trepreneurial ability are captured by exp
α[x∗(α,σ2z ,Γ(N))−x∗(α,σ2z ,Γ(N∗))]
1−α . Hence, the av-
erage revenue differences across firms can be measured by
RNs
N∗ exp
α[x∗(α,σ2z,Γ(N))−x∗(α,σ2z,Γ(N∗))]
1−α dN
Ns−N∗ .
Equation (14) suggests that 1−α
α
N∗
Ns−N∗ is equivalent to the average revenue differences
across firms.
Note that the average revenue differences can also be interpreted as the average
size differences. Equations (5) and (6) imply that the expected revenue differences are
translated into differences in expected labor cost and differences in expected profits.
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Hence, it is natural to interpret
RNs
N∗ exp
α[x∗(α,σ2z,Γ(N))−x∗(α,σ2z,Γ(N∗))]
1−α dN
Ns−N∗ and, therefore,
1−α
α
N∗
Ns−N∗ , as a measure of average size differences.
This interpretation suggests that the average firm size and the average size dif-
ferences move together with N∗ in the equilibrium. Applying the implicit function
theorem, we can show how the changes in α and σ2z influence N
∗. The formal proof
is established in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 There is a function N such that
N∗ = N
¡
α,σ2z;Γ
¢
, Nα > 0, Nσ2z > 0.
This proposition implies that if goods are substitutable and the economy is risky,
the number of workers is large, the average firm size is large, and the average size
differences across firms are large.
This is because ability is complementary to risk and the substitutability of goods.
A risky environment demands more accurate information. An increase in risk then
increases the importance of prediction, whereas an increase in the substitutability of
goods makes demand more sensitive to changes in tastes. Hence, they both increase
the benefits of able entrepreneurs and less able entrepreneurs are forced to be workers.
This results in an increase in the average firm size and the average size differences
across firms.
It is interesting to note that an increase in risk may increase size. The standard
argument emphasizes the tradeoff between static efficiency and flexibility under un-
certain demand. As efficiency is easily converted to size and a risky environment
demands flexibility, there is a tradeoff between size and risk [e.g., Mills and Schu-
mann (1985)]. In fact, it would be possible to extend our model to derive a negative
relationship between risk and size by introducing irreversible investment. In this
sense, we cannot take this result as an empirically testable prediction. Rather, this
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proposition suggests that there is a neglected mechanism where risk increases size.
The relationship between risk and size may then be more complex than conventional
theories suggest.
Real GDP: In order to understand the impact on productivity, we derive real GDP
in this model. Note that the definition of nominal GDP implies
Y n =
Z Ns
N∗
Eη
∗(Γ(N)) [px] dN. (15)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (13), nominal GDP is shown to be propor-
tional to the total labor cost:
Y n =
wN∗
α
. (16)
In order to derive real GDP, we require an aggregate price index. Substituting
equation (10) into (15), the aggregate price index is shown to decline as a result of
entrepreneurship in the economy.
P =
w
αz∗
, (17)
z∗ =
∙Z 1
N∗
exp
αx (α,σ2z,Γ (N))
1− α dN
¸ 1−α
α
.
Note that P is decreasing in z∗, which is a positive function of the total sum of
the relative expected revenue gain due to entrepreneurship. When all entrepreneurs
process information, they can increase revenue on average. However, total expendi-
ture is given by Y n. This means that an increase in the revenue of a particular firm
results in the reduction of expenditure on other firms, bringing about a reduction in
the aggregate price index.
Dividing nominal GDP by the aggregate price index, real GDP can be expressed
as a function of the number of workers and z∗:
Y =
Y n
P
= z∗N∗.
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This equation shows that z∗ also represents the improvement in aggregate produc-
tivity due to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship increases aggregate productivity
because it improves the allocative efficiency of the economy. Because entrepreneur-
ship allows managers to provide output when needed, it also improves social welfare.
As shown when Y =
R
Ujdj, the improvement in social welfare is captured by the
increase in real GDP.
Aggregate productivity z∗ can be decomposed into a level effect and a distribu-
tional effect:
z∗ = Dist× Level,
Dist =
µZ Ns
N∗
exp
α [x∗ (α,σ2z,Γ (N))− x∗ (α,σ2z,Γ (N∗))]
1− α dN
¶ 1−α
α
,
Level = expx∗
¡
α,σ2z,Γ (N
∗)
¢
.
If there is no heterogeneity across agents, everybody has the same ability, Γ (N∗).
Hence, only the level effect, expx∗ (α,σ2z,Γ (N
∗)), influences the productivity. It im-
plies that expx∗ (α,σ2z,Γ (N)) can be interpreted as the productivity gain induced by
ability Γ (N). Then, the distribution effect,
µR Ns
N∗ exp
α[x∗(α,σ2z,Γ(N))−x∗(α,σ2z,Γ(N∗))]
1−α dN
¶ 1−α
α
,
can be interpreted as the weighted sum of productivity differences across firms. This
summarizes the productivity improvement due to heterogeneous ability.
More importantly, equation (14) implies that the magnitude of the distributional
effect is captured by the amount of workers in the economy. As the large productivity
gain from entrepreneurship brings about a large revenue gain, the weighted sum
of productivity differences across firms are converted into the total sum of revenue
differences across firms. On the other hand, large revenue differences mean that
relatively talented entrepreneurs are stealing large amounts of demand from less able
entrepreneurs. Hence, marginal entrepreneurs are forced to be workers. That
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is, the distributional effect influences aggregate productivity through the selection
mechanism.
Substituting equation (14) into the distributional effect, real GDP can be rewritten
as follows.
Y =
∙
1− α
α
¸ 1−α
α £
expx∗
¡
α,σ2z,Γ (N
∗)
¢¤
[N∗]
1
α .
This equation suggests that real GDP is larger when the productivity of a marginal
firm and the number of workers are large. The number of workers captures all
distributional effects. It means that the impacts of heterogeneity on real GDP
disappear once we control the number of workers.
5 The Distribution of Entrepreneurial Ability
In this section, we analyze how the distribution of entrepreneurial ability influences
the firm size distribution and aggregate productivity. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the population is equal to 1 and that ability is uniformly distributed.
Suppose that G (A) =
R A
Al
1
γAl
da. Then, Γ (N) = (γN + 1)Al. The parameter γ
represents ability differences, while the parameter Al captures the overall level of
ability. Real GDP and the equilibrium condition are rewritten as follows.
Y =
∙
1− α
α
¸ 1−α
α £
expx
¡
α,σ2z, (γN
∗ + 1)Al
¢¤
[N∗]
1
α ,
(1− α)N∗
α
=
Z 1
N∗
exp
α [x (α,σ2z, (γN + 1)Al)− x (α,σ2z, (γN∗ + 1)Al)]
1− α dN.
We assume that γ >
h
2β(1−α)
σ2zAl
− 1
i
. This condition guarantees that the most able
entrepreneurs have an incentive to processes information.
The following proposition can be proved. The formal proof is established in the
Appendix.
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Proposition 2 Increases in both γ and Al increase Y . On the other hand, while
N∗ is clearly increasing in γ, the effect of Al on N∗ is ambiguous.
Nγ
¡
α,σ2z; γ, Al
¢
> 0,
dY
dγ
> 0,
dY
dAl
> 0.
The result shows that although increases in both γ and Al improve the produc-
tivity of economy, only a change in γ brings about a clear selection effect. When
all agents improve their abilities, marginal entrepreneurs may be able to survive
competition and remain as entrepreneurs due to their improved ability. Hence,
NAl (α,σ
2
z; γ, Al) is ambiguous. However, an increase in γ means that able entre-
preneurs improve their ability more than less able entrepreneurs, and the marginal
entrepreneurs are selected to be workers. Because of this selection effect, a change
in γ increases the average firm size and the average size differences.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper models entrepreneurship as entrepreneur’s information processing activity
in order to predict changes in demand, and analyzes how entrepreneurship influences
aggregate productivity and the distribution of firm size. We emphasize the productive
impacts of competition and selection as a result of entrepreneurship.
Several extensions are considered. First, this paper emphasizes the importance
of processing information for the adaptation to idiosyncratic shocks as a neglected
role of entrepreneurship. Modeling firm entrepreneurship as information processing
activity can address broader issues relating to entrepreneurship if the adjustment in
input costs and persistent shocks are incorporated into the model. The broader issues
that can be addressed include adopting a new technology, starting a new business,
and developing a new product. These extensions are important so as to appreciate
all aspects of entrepreneurship.
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Second, in this paper we assume that the distribution of ability is given. This is
useful for simple analysis. However, as the literature on entrepreneurship suggests,
ability can be acquired through previous experience and/or education. These invest-
ments change the future distribution of ability, while the expected future distribution
of ability influences the incentive of entrepreneurs to invest. It would be interesting
to examine what equilibrium is then obtained. This extension is also left for future
research.
7 Appendix
The Proof of Theorem 1, and Proposition 1 and 2: Without loss of generality,
we prove the theorem and propositions under the assumption of Ns = 1 and Γ (N) =
(γN + 1)Al. Define a function B so that
B
¡
N∗,α,σ2z, γ, Al
¢
≡ 1− α
α
N∗−
Z 1
N∗
exp
α [x (α,σ2z, (γN + 1)Al)− x (α,σ2z, (γN∗ + 1)Al)]
1− α dN.
AsB (0,α,σ2z, γ, Al) < 0, B (1,α,σ
2
z, γ, Al) > 0 andBN (N
∗,α,σ2z, γ, Al) |B(N∗,α,σ2z ,γ,Al)=0 =
1
α
+ x∗3 (α,σ
2
z, (γN
∗ + 1)Al) γAlN
∗ > 0, the existence and uniqueness are obvious.
Note that
Ni
¡
α,σ2z, γ, Al
¢
= −
Bi (N
∗,α,σ2z, γ, Al) |B(N∗,α,σ2z ,γ,Al)=0
BN (N∗,α,σ2z, γ, Al) |B(N∗,α,σ2z,γ,Al)=0
, i = α,σ2z, γ, Al.
Now, it is easy to derive that
Bα
¡
N∗,α,σ2z, γ, Al
¢ |B(N∗,α,σ2z ,γ,Al)=0 = −L∗α − Fα,
Bi
¡
N∗,α,σ2z, γ, Al
¢ |B(N∗,α,σ2z ,γ,Al)=0 = −Fi, i = σ2z, γ, Al,
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where
Fi =
α
1− α
Z 1
N∗
Di exp
α
⎡
⎣ x
∗ (α,σ2z, (γN + 1)Al)
−x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN∗ + 1)Al)
⎤
⎦
1− α dN,
Di =
∂x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN + 1)Al)− x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN∗ + 1)Al)
∂i
, i = α,σ2z, γ, Al.
Suppose that N∗ ≤ 1
γ
h
2β(1−α)
σ2zAl
− 1
i
. Then x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN
∗ + 1)Al) = 0. Because we
assume that γ >
h
2β(1−α)
σ2zAl
− 1
i
, equation (8) implies that Di is positive for some N
where i = α,σ2z, γ, Al. Hence Ni (α,σ
2
z, γ, Al) is positive for i = α,σ
2
z, γ, Al. Suppose
that N∗ > 1
γ
h
2β(1−α)
σ2zAl
− 1
i
. Equation (9) implies that Dα and Dσ2z are still positive.
Hence, Nα (α,σ2z, γ, Al) and Nσ2z (α,σ
2
z, γ, Al) are positive. We need to check Dγ and
DAl.
∂x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN + 1)Al)
∂γ∂N
=
β
n¡
1− γN
2
¢q
σ2z(γN+1)Al
2β(1−α) − (1− γN)
o
(γN + 1)3A2l
≥
β
£¡
1− γN
2
¢
− (1− γN)
¤
(γN + 1)3A2l
=
βγN
2 (γN + 1)3A2l
> 0.
Hence,Dγ andNγ (α,σ2z, γ, Al) are also positive. On the other hand, as
∂x∗(α,σ2z,(γN+1)Al)
∂Al∂N
can be positive or negative, NAl (α,σ
2
z, γ, Al) is ambiguous.
Because Nγ (α,σ2z, γ, Al) > 0,
dY
dγ
> 0. We need to check the sign of dY
dAl
.
dY
dAl
=
1
α
∙
1− α
α
¸ 1−α
α £
expx∗
¡
α,σ2z, (γN
∗ + 1)Al
¢¤
(N∗)
1
α
−1XAl,
XAl = α
∂x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN
∗ + 1)Al)
∂Al
N∗ +
∙
1 + α
∂x∗ (α,σ2z, (γN
∗ + 1)Al)
∂N∗
N∗
¸
NAl
¡
γ, Al,σ
2
z,α
¢
.
As it is shown that XAl > 0,
dY
dAl
> 0. Q.E.D.
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